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This paper uses stochastic frontier analyses to estimate the cost efficiency of toll motorway 
companies in Spain, disentangling between two types of efficiency: persistent efficiency, 
related to project building and sunk costs, and transient efficiency, more closely related to 
management efficiency. The differences between the two sources of efficiency are significant, 
allowing us to test how different regulations impact performance. We find that regional 
governments grant more efficient projects than those granted by central government, but we do 
not find significant differences in performance in relation to the public/private ownership share, 
following the privatization of publicly owned concessionaires or due to changes in price 
updating regulations (price cap). The motorways nationalized in the 1980s had lower persistent 
efficiency levels, while management seems to have had a limited role in promoting efficiency 
gains. Furthermore, our results support the existence of scale and density economies in Spain, 
showing that an increase in vehicle-kilometers is more important than extending the motorway. 
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Road transport, as a major means of transportation, has had a significant influence on all 
areas of economic, political and social development since earliest times. Indeed, its role in 
public infrastructure investment and its links with economic growth, productivity and 
employment have been extensively studied, most notably in the economics literature since 
Aschauer’s seminal work (1989).1 Yet, very little is known about the efficiency and 
productivity of motorway management and the impact produced by specific public policies and 
reforms related to motorway ownership and regulation.  
In some countries, motorway networks are managed directly by the State (or by a publicly 
owned corporation operating under private law), while in others, private companies manage 
motorways under concession contracts, a toll being charged as a return on their investment and 
to meet maintenance and operation costs. These Public-Private Partnership (PPP) contracts are 
designed and awarded in the expectation of improving efficiency and, above all, of facilitating 
private financing. However, toll regulation has typically been shown to be unrelated to the 
degree of productivity or the efficiency of concessionaires (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009), 
especially in the absence of price-cap regulation (Iossa, 2015), and satisfying uncertain demand 
in the long run is the main factor determining the outcome of the standard fixed-term concession 
contract (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 1997a; 2001).2 Even if motorway managers appear to 
                                                 
1 See Matas, Raymond and Roig (2015) for recent studies on the link between road investments and productivity; 
See Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al. (2009) and Albalate and Fageda (2015) for recent studies on the link between 
motorways and employment.  
2 Determinants of motorway demand that lie beyond the control of the concessionaire include fuel prices, 
macroeconomic conditions, population growth, per capita income distribution, the existence of alternative cheaper 
roads or modes of transportation, changes in urbanization and land use, weather conditions and changes in transport 
technology (Yescombe, 2007; Albalate, 2014; Iossa, 2015) 
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have little scope for improving their overall cost efficiency, given the overriding importance of 
capital costs (investment) in their cost structure, and “can do little to increase demand”, as 
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2002, p. 22) claim, the empirical literature remains scarce and 
overly limited to allow us to draw any general conclusions about efficient management in the 
sector and its determinants. 
Clearly, regulators seek to increase the efficiency of service providers by implementing 
regulatory and policy changes. To this end, analyses of the efficiency of regulated industries, 
such as energy systems (Lin and Wang, 2014; Chen, Pestana and Borges, 2015; Ghosh and 
Kathuria, 2016) and water services (Phillips, 2013; Carvalho and Cunha-Marques, 2016); 
transport services, including buses (Bel and Rosell, 2016, Vigren, 2016; Wegelin, 2018) and 
railroads (Couto and Graham, 2009); and transport infrastructures such as ports (Cullinane et 
al., 2006; Tongzon and Heng, 2005) and airports (Martin and Voltes-Dorta, 2011; Adler and 
Liebert, 2014), have figured among the most frequent applications of cost efficiency analysis 
using (stochastic) frontier models. Recently, such efficiency analyses have begun to distinguish 
between transient and persistent inefficiency, where the latter absorbs structural problems in 
the firm or systematic shortfalls in its management, and the former is a time-variant component 
that absorbs changes in a firm’s efficiency. However, the empirical literature in general has 
failed to pay sufficient attention to the distinction between these two components of a firm’s 
efficiency (Filippini and Greene, 2016). A number of recent analyses, focusing on energy 
efficiency (Filippini and Hunt, 2015), banking (Mamatzakis et al., 2015) and the nursing home 
sector (Di Giorgio et al., 2015), nevertheless, emphasize the importance of distinguishing 
between these two types of efficiency and of measuring it accurately for policy analysis. Since 
most of the regulators use carrot-and-stick principles, they have to quantify the margin by which 
they have to increase their efficiency. Moreover, the literature dedicated to studying the 
efficiency of public utilities has largely neglected the motorway industry with just a few specific 
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exceptions, most notably Benfratello, Iozzi and Valbonessi (2009) for Italy, and Odeck (2008a) 
and Welde and Odeck (2011) for Norway.  
This paper extends this literature by drawing on a new, self-constructed dataset for Spain, 
the country with the largest number of private concessionaires (for-profit) and with a 
longstanding tradition of PPPs (Albalate, 2014). The Spanish experience is particularly 
insightful due to the lessons it can offer. Spanish motorway concessionaires have experienced 
periods of vigorous economic growth and financial distress, have had to adapt to a variety of 
regulatory reforms, and have undergone transitions from private to public management via the 
nationalization of bankrupt concessionaires and the privatization of publicly owned toll 
motorway companies. This variety of experience makes Spain an interesting case in which to 
evaluate how policy changes and reforms affect efficiency.  
The dataset covers a time span of 26 years, from 1988 to 2015, and allows us to evaluate 
the efficiency of concessionaires during these distinct periods. Moreover, it means we can take 
into consideration regulatory changes (price cap schemes, privatizations, etc.) and the different 
features of motorways (length, network expansions, physical features, technological advances, 
etc.) that might have impacted on concessionaire cost efficiency. We analyze the effects of a 
variety of public policies and regulatory reforms on the efficiency of toll motorway companies 
by specifically reporting transient and persistent efficiency estimations. Furthermore, we 
contribute to the literature by undertaking a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate cost 
efficiency in the motorway sector distinguishing between time variant and invariant efficiency.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the extant literature 
examining the efficiency of motorways. In section 3, we outline our technical approach by 
presenting the model implemented. Section 4 presents our data and the main descriptive 
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statistics on Spanish motorways. Our results are presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 provides our main conclusions and policy recommendations.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature analyzing the efficiency of motorway management is scant. To the best of 
our knowledge, only two experiences of toll road concessions have been examined in the 
literature: the Norwegian and Italian cases. In the former, efficiency was first estimated by 
Amdal et al. (2007) and Odeck (2008a). Since concessionaires are public companies under local 
authority ownership, the Norwegian case is unusual. As Estache and de Rus (2000) highlighted, 
the system uses dedicated non-profit companies to collect tolls, while the government road 
administration retains responsibility over road design, construction and maintenance (see 
Odeck, 2008a). These characteristics make Norway quite a singular case, with few points in 
common with the Spanish case.  
Amdal et al. (2007) used panel data for 26 toll collection companies – including some toll 
cordons – with a time series that extends between two and seven years (1998 to 2004). They 
found evidence of sizable unexploited economies of scale in costs when estimating a translog 
cost function for traffic and other controls with a random effects estimator. Average costs were 
reported to be decreasing in traffic volume for low levels, becoming flat for high-density traffic. 
Other controls, such as the number of lanes and total debt were both positively correlated with 
operating costs. However, the former appeared to be especially sensitive – probably due to their 
correlation with traffic – to model specification, becoming insignificant in the simplest models. 
In contrast, competitive tendering and the number of cars with on board paying units lowered 
operating costs, which points to the relevance of regulation and technology advances in toll 
collecting systems.  
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Odeck (2008a) also evaluated this experience but employed a different methodological 
approach, namely, a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to assess input technical 
inefficiency. The sample comprised 18 companies over a time span of four years (2001-2004).  
Results also confirmed the potential for efficiency gains (of about 14 per cent) and the existence 
of economies of scale. New electronic methods of collecting tolls seemed to contribute to 
efficiency improvements, but represented sizable investments in the short run. Another result 
worth mentioning was the role of company age, found to be positively associated with 
efficiency, which could point to some sort of learning effect.  
Later, Welde and Odeck (2011) expanded their DEA to include an SFA for a production 
function. This study examined a six-year period (2003-2008) and considered 20 toll companies. 
The main finding once again was the significant potential for efficiency improvements and 
further evidence of the importance of technology advances in toll collection. The age of the toll 
company, however, appeared to be sensitive to the method used, given that it was significant 
according to SFA, but not according to DEA, which contradicted previous evidence. However, 
the authors reported the absence of economies of scale (also contradicting earlier evidence 
presented in Odeck, 2008a), a result that was maintained irrespective of the method applied. 
The paper’s findings also contradicted the results of Amdal et al. (2007) as regards the 
contribution of competitive tendering, although the efficiency considered in the latter study by 
was based on average costs rather than on a production function.  
The second experience evaluated by the literature is that of the Italian motorway sector. A 
number of early studies on productivity and operating efficiency were somewhat limited from 
a technical perspective and focused on the impact of privatization. Ragazzi (2008) found 
evidence of economies of scale, although the study links this result to the importance of 
Autostrade (the country’s leading privatized concessionaire in what is a small sample), and the 
fact that its operation costs were much lower than the industry mean. Massiani and Ragazzi 
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(2008) provided findings on the relationship between privatization and efficiency. They 
reported no statistically significant impact of the privatization of the network on productivity. 
The authors considered productivity ratios based on traffic with respect to costs, and traffic 
revenues with respect to total costs, as being invalid. Rather, they claimed that productivity 
should be assessed by means of the sole consideration of operating costs, since amortization 
and financial costs depend upon historical investment costs and the length of the concession. 
Here, they found that operating costs largely depended on traffic and capacity, but they found 
no clear evidence of economies of scale. 
A more technical, in-depth analysis of the Italian toll motorway sector was performed by 
Benfratello, Iozzi and Valbonesi (2009). This was the first paper to study a stochastic cost 
frontier function for the motorway sector. Their sample included 20 Italian concessionaires and 
covered a time span of 13 years (1992-2004). Italy’s experience is much more similar to that of 
Spain’s, with a large presence of private companies, which makes this paper the closest to ours. 
Their empirical analysis based on SFA for a cost function concluded that the industry clearly 
exhibited scale economies for small- and medium-sized concessionaires operating in the Italian 
network. An equiproportional increase in traffic and network size caused a less than 
proportional increase in costs for networks up to 300 km. Besides scale economies, the authors 
also found large density economies and steady productivity gains over time. Interestingly, the 
authors found that privately owned concessionaires have a cost advantage of about 3% over 
their publicly owned counterparts. By contrast, the introduction of a price cap – which in theory 
should serve as a productivity-enhancing mechanism – did not have any effect on efficiency. 
Unfortunately, given the nature of their dataset, they could not establish the size of the network 




3. METHODOLOGY: COST FUNCTION AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
The estimation of frontier functions is the econometric exercise of making the empirical 
implementation consistent with the underlying theoretical proposition that no observed agent 
can exceed the ideal (Greene, 2008). In practice, the frontier function model is a regression 
model that allows efficiency to be measured, that is, an empirical estimation of the extent to 
which firms achieve a theoretical ideal. Only a few firms typically manage to operate at this 
frontier. Measuring the resulting efficiency is the ultimate goal of stochastic frontier analysis.  
Parametric approaches can be subdivided into deterministic and stochastic models. 
Deterministic models allow the researcher to distinguish between technical efficiency and 
statistical noise, while the stochastic approach takes into consideration both technical efficiency 
and random noise. On a stochastic frontier, one company can usually be assumed to operate at 
the efficiency level. Farrell (1957) was the first to measure productive efficiency empirically. 
This efficiency is evaluated by comparing best firm practice with that of the rest.  
We adopt a stochastic cost frontier model for panel data in order to analyze the impact of 
different variables on a concessionaire’s total costs. The cost function gives the minimum 
expenditure needed to produce a given output. The purpose of a motorway concessionaire is to 
maximize the total distance covered by the vehicles, assuming total costs to be a function of 
input prices. Capital costs are included since the concessionaire expands the investment over 
time, not only when the highway is built. About a third of the total initial investment is extended 
(additional lanes in some parts, technology in the toll system, etc.), so it is our contention that 
this must be taken into account in the objective of cost minimization. Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) propose the first estimation procedure for inefficiencies, 
an important derivative when estimating the frontier cost function. Based on previous studies, 




   TC𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑇)     
where the total cost of concessionaire firm TC is assumed to be a function of output Y, factor 
prices PL (price of labor), PM (price of maintenance) and PC (price of capital), network 
characteristics N and a time trend 𝑇. In this sector, just what constitutes the network 
characteristics that account for differences between motorway concessionaries is open to 
debate. Motorway length is one characteristic that has an impact on total costs. The number of 
accidents with victims is potentially another relevant motorway characteristic, given that a 
concessionaire seeks to minimize such accidents because of their associated costs and because 
of the negative effect they have on user perceptions regarding safety.3  
Our main objective is to estimate a translog cost function. The translog has the 
advantage that it does not impose a priori restrictions on the nature of the technology. However, 
should the model specification include variables that are relatively highly correlated, then the 
estimation of the translog cost function can suffer from multicollinearity. Therefore, we 
estimate a reduced version of the translog, where all interaction variables between the price of 
inputs, the output and network characteristics have been dropped.  
As a result, the stochastic cost frontier equation to be estimated can be expressed in the 
following double log form: 
                                                 
3 The total number of accidents could be a substitute for accidents with victims, but there is a discontinuity in the 











































2 + βTTt + uit + υit 
 where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 31 denoting the concessionaire and 𝑡 = 1988, 1989, … , 2015  denoting the 
year. The total costs (TC) are the sum of labor, maintenance and capital costs, where the price 
of labor (PL), the price of maintenance (PM) and the price of capital (PC) are the three input 
factor prices. The output (Y) is the number of vehicle-kilometers. The network characteristics 
are the motorway length (LEN) and the number of accidents with victims (ACC). Finally, T is 
a time trend that captures changes in the cost over time. The random term is divided into a 
normally distributed error term υit and the non-negative inefficiency term uit following a 
truncated non-negative normal distribution 𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). Between both terms, there is an 
independent distribution assumption. Estimating a cost frontier allows us to compare the 
performance on two sides of the model: that of the cost function coefficients and that of 
efficiency. There is some evidence of a trade-off between the coefficients estimated and 
efficiency.  
The cost inefficiency measures how much a motorway concessionaire is able to reduce 
its costs while maintaining the same level of output. In a context in which demand is determined 
and cannot be stored, as is the case of the motorway sector, this is especially relevant. We use 
input-oriented efficiency measurement, that is, a concessionaire’s objective is to produce a 
given level of output at the minimum possible cost. This view is useful if the output, for 
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example, vehicle-kilometers, is exogenously given.4 After all, on the cost side, any errors in 
optimization, technical or allocative, must show up as higher costs.  
The first application of panel data models to SFA was undertaken by Pitt and Lee (1981) 
in the form of a random effect model (RE). The authors assume that the inefficiency term ui is 
constant in time and that it captures firm inefficiency; concessionaire specific inefficiency is 
the same in each time period. This might represent quite a strong assumption for a long panel, 
although it might be plausible when a firm operates in a non-competitive environment, such as 
that of motorway concessions. In a regulated industry, all firms might be operating under excess 
capacity, which could be reflected in high inefficiency values. Another limitation of this model 
is that no correlation is assumed between the explanatory variables and inefficiency. In these 
models, any individual-specific or unobserved heterogeneity is captured by the inefficiency 
term ui or a constant: the Pitt and Lee model (1981) underestimates the level of efficiency. 
A shortcoming in the Pitt and Lee (1981) model is that it cannot disentangle a firm’s 
inefficiency from cost differences due to the unobserved characteristics of the concession area. 
Usually, such companies cannot control for those concession characteristics such as the terrain 
slope, viaducts or tunnels needed, etc. that cannot simply be attributed to concessionaire 
performance. To overcome this problem, Greene (2005a and 2005b) proposes a model that 
captures invariant unmeasured unobserved heterogeneity in a specific term, besides a firm-
specific inefficiency term and a random noise term. The true random effects (TRE) 
                                                 
4 Although toll motorway companies wish to increase the outcome variable to collect more revenues, there is 
sufficient consensus in the literature to believe that traffic can be considered exogenous. The action of the 
concessionaire exerts some impact on demand, but the sensitivity of their returns to the materialization of demand 
is not proportionate to the limited degree of control that it has over this variable (Tirole, 1997). Indeed, traffic risk 
depends little on what the concessionaire does, nor is it possible to estimate this risk with any acceptable degree 
of precision (Engel et al., 1997b). This is because demand is basically affected by elements outside the control of 
the concessionaire, such as population growth, distribution and movement; economic activity and location; land 




specification, unobserved cost differences across firms that remain constant over time, is driven 
by unobserved characteristics rather than by inefficiency. Thus, time invariant inefficiency is 
interpreted as concessionaire specific heterogeneity, as it is not captured by the inefficiency 
term. This time invariant unobserved characteristic not absorbed by the inefficiency term is 
beyond the control of the concessionaire due to the concession characteristics.  
Recently, models have focused on separating productive efficiency into its persistent 
and transient parts within the same model. The first studies in this line were Colombi et al. 
(2014), Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2014), Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) and Filippini 
and Greene (2016). Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) proposed a model that splits the 
error term in four components in order to capture these effects, estimating the firm’s 
inefficiency using the conditional mean of the efficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. 
(1982). 
The persistent term is related to the presence of structural problems in the organization 
of the production process of a concessionaire or to the presence of systematic shortfalls in 
managerial capabilities. This cost efficiency does not vary over time, and can be caused by 
structural problems in the motorway concession, by structural factors that have not been well 
allocated, by geographic heterogeneity or by long-term management mistakes, among others. 
The Pitt and Lee (1981) model tends to reflect the persistent part of the time-invariant values.5 
In contrast, the transient term is related to the presence of non-systematic management problems 
that can be solved in the short term, improving the efficiency levels. This part is time varying, 
                                                 
5 Battese and Coelli (1995) introduce time variation and environmental variables. However, the time invariant 
random component is still a major influence on the component. Results differ greatly from those provided by 
models in which the random part varies with time. That is, a concessionaire observed in two periods is treated as 
two different firms. This assumption does not allow us to estimate the inefficiency level consistently since its 
variance does not vanish as the sample size increases 
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reflecting temporal management mistakes or temporal events affecting the concession. Whereas 
a transient efficiency due to short-run rigidities or mismanagement is easy to increase, input 
allocation is difficult to change in order to increase the concessionaire’s persistent efficiency.  
In Greene’s TRE model, any persistent component of the inefficiency is absorbed in the 
individual-specific constant term and, not accounted for in its efficiency. In industries in which 
certain sources of efficiency result in time-invariant excess of inputs, the estimated inefficiency 
could be relatively small. Filippini and Greene (2015) find that the TRE model tends to estimate 
the transient part of efficiency, whereas the Pitt and Lee (1981) model does not capture 
persistent efficiency well. The efficiency index is calculated using the estimator of Battese and 
Coelli (1988) in TRE and Pitt and Lee model. 
Note at this point that the main reason for focusing on stochastic frontier analysis rather 
than on other methods, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), is to separate both types of 
efficiency. However, recent applications on DEA have begun to address this separation of 
efficiency types (Pérez-López et al., 2018). Although in this paper we do not compare the two 
methodologies, it is something that should be taken into account in future studies. 
A derivative from the half translog approach is the possibility it affords of calculating 
the economies of density and scale. The economies of density (ED) are defined as the inverse 
of the elasticity of costs with respect to output; the relative increase in total costs resulting from 






=  (βY + βYY𝑙𝑛𝑌)
−1 
Economies of density imply that the average total costs of a motorway concessionaire 




diseconomies of density are present for values less than one; while values equal to one indicate 
that the firm is operating at the optimal level, holding all other factors constant. 
Economies of scale (ES) measure the reaction recorded by total costs when the output 
and the network length increase in the same proportion, holding other network characteristics 









=  (βY + +βYY𝑙𝑛𝑌 + βLEN + βLENLEN𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐸𝑁)
−1 
Thus, economies of scale exist if ES is greater than one, that is, the average total costs of a 
motorway concessionaire decrease as the vehicle-kilometers and motorway length increase in 
the same proportion, holding all other parameters constant. Economies of scale exist if ES is 
equal to one and diseconomies of scale exist if ES is less than one. It is important to assume 
that any increase in the network length raises the output level in the same proportion (Caves et 
al., 1984). 
4. DATA 
The Spanish motorway industry forms part of the country’s national road network, 
providing public service infrastructure. The dataset used in this paper is extracted from the 
annual reports published by the Secretary-General of Infrastructure and Transport at the 
Spanish Ministry of Transportation. The first year included is 1988, given that in years prior to 
that date the majority of variables are unavailable. The result is an unbalanced data panel, where 
the total number of observations through to 2015 is 461. In the initial years, between eight and 
ten companies are compared, while by the end of the period the number of concessionaires 
reaches thirty-one. The dataset includes all of Spain’s tolled motorways, with the exception of 
some of the Basque country’s motorways for certain years. The Basque foral regime (specific 




government. The sample, however, does represent 96 per cent of the total motorway 
observations. 
The information available for any given year includes total costs, structural costs, capital 
costs, vehicle-kilometers, number of employees, motorway lengths and number of accidents. 
The cost function includes one output, three inputs, two network variables and a time trend.  
On the cost function side, the total cost (TC) is the dependent variable and includes labor, 
maintenance and capital costs.6 The price of labor (PL) is given by the ratio between total 
salaries and the total number of full-time equivalent workers.7 The price of maintenance (PM) 
is calculated as material and external service costs divided by the motorway length. The price 
of labor and maintenance should be positive. The price of capital (PC) is obtained by amortizing 
the costs of all concessionaire investments related to motorway length and the financial costs. 
This variable divides the other price inputs and the total costs.  
On the output side, the literature considers two main groups: supply- and demand-related 
measures. Supply measures, such as network length multiplied by the number of lanes, are the 
most suitable. However, the relative homogeneity of motorways and the absence of available 
data mean this is not an option available to us. On the demand side, the number of vehicles is a 
key determinant. However, several concessionaires have more than one motorway, or there are 
marked differences on the same motorway in terms of average daily traffic, depending on the 
measurement point. For this reason, the output (Y) variable opted for is vehicle-kilometers, 
                                                 
6All costs are adjusted for inflation using the Spanish CPI, measured in 2002 euros. Before 2001, financial data 
have been converted from the former Spanish currency (pesetas) to euros.  
7 Input prices are calculated as in other sectors, and in line with Benfratello et al. (2009) for the motorway sector.  
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which accounts for the distance travelled by every vehicle.8 It should be noted that this demand 
indicator reflects consumer preferences, above and beyond the objectives of the concessionaire 
under control. The necessary assumption of output being exogenous is based on the 
monopolistic structure of the motorway concessions. The expected sign is positive, that is, an 
increase in the number of vehicles and in the distance travelled should result in higher total 
costs for the concessionaire. However, we question whether the addition of more vehicles 
would result in a stronger relation with total costs. 
As for the network characteristics, total motorway length (LEN) captures the network size. 
We expect a positive relation between motorway length and total costs. One variable of network 
quality is the number of accidents suffered by the concession (ACC). The concessionaire has 
incentives to minimize the number of road accidents since they result in emergency costs, traffic 
jams and a lower user-perceived quality. We expect a positive sign; that is, total costs should 
increase if the number of accidents increases.  
The time trend should capture technological progress. Here, we would expect a negative 
sign because, although this sector is not characterized by significant changes in production 
technology, after several years a certain technological progress can be expected. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the concessionaires. Information for total costs, price 
of inputs, inputs, vehicle-kilometers, network length, and the number of road accident victims 
includes the mean, standard deviation, and first and third quartiles. Two large concessionaires 
(ACESA and AUMAR) can be characterized as outliers (there being a close coincidence 
                                                 
8 Benfratello et al. (2009) use the same output for a total cost function, Amdal et al. (2007) the total number of 
vehicles per year, Odeck (2008) annual traffic through tolls and Welde and Odeck (2011) the annual traffic through 
tolls divided by the number of lanes served. Although the output is not directly produced by the concessionaire, it 
is the best approximation.  
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between their mean and third quartile values). As for the price of inputs, the price of labor is 
around 29,000 € per worker, with a low standard deviation, while the prices of maintenance and 
capital are 94,741 and 136,339 € per kilometer, respectively, with a larger standard deviation. 
This is due to the existence of motorways with tunnels, where these price as expected increase 
sharply.  
INSERT Table 1: Summary statistics 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Regression results 
The regression results of the model specified in Eq. 2 are presented in Table 2.9 Since all 
variables are expressed in logarithms and normalized on the mean, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. The original values of the monetary variables are deflated by a price 
index. A log-likelihood test confirms that a half translog is preferred to a Cobb-Douglas 
specification with the 1% significance level to the left.  
INSERT Table 2: Stochastic estimates of total cost function parameter  
The coefficients associated with the main variables present the expected sign and are 
statistically significant.10 The only unexpected result is the non significant value of output. 
While it may seem surprising, it is well known that output (traffic demand) is mostly exogenous 
for a toll motorway company, with only part of it being dependent on the actions of the manager 
(See Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 1997b; and Tirole, 1997, for a debate on toll motorway 
                                                 
9 This model has been implemented using Stata following Kumbhakar et al. (2015). 
10 A sensitivity analysis was conducted omitting the number of accidents with victims. The same results held not 




regulation and the commonly held view regarding the limited control on demand that toll 
motorway concessionaires have).  
Motorway length is a significant and positive network parameter that affects the 
concessionaires’ total costs – a one percent increase in total motorway length increases total 
costs by between 0.75 and 0.80%. This is also an expected outcome in the network industry, as 
total costs are higher if the network length is increased than if the total distance travelled by 
motorway users rises. The number of accidents with victims related to motorway traffic is non-
significant in all models, indicating that the number of total accidents does not affect total 
motorway costs. The labor and maintenance input price elasticities are 0.14 and 0.27, 
respectively.  
The time trend is negative and significant in all models, implying a 0.4% decrease in 
total costs each year. This result is in line with the outcome reported by Benfratello et al. (2009) 
with a 0.3-0.5 technological progress per year. In common with these authors, this can 
reasonably be accounted for in terms of the introduction of automatic toll systems, which reduce 
labor costs, and the increase in management experience obtained over time. However, given 
the relatively small values of the coefficients, they do not represent structural industry changes.  
Table 3 shows that both economies of density and scale are present, which points to 
unexploited economies. The values, however, are higher for economies of density, indicating 
that an increase in the number of vehicles has greater effects than extending the motorway 
network. In other words, a more intensive use of a given motorway would lower the average 
cost considerably more than by extending it. However, recall that increasing the number of 
vehicle-kilometers is usually beyond the capabilities of the concessionaires. The variation 
across the parameters of economies of density can be attributed to the unobserved network 
effects, which are partially correlated with output and motorway length. We can confirm that 
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economies of scale are only present on larger motorways as their operating costs are lower than 
those of small and medium-sized motorways.  
INSERT Table 3. Scale and density economies 
5.2.  Efficiencies and policy changes  
One of the reasons for estimating a stochastic cost frontier is to obtain the efficiency 
parameters. The value of the log likelihood ratio between the random and TRE model is 11.99, 
which is greater than the critical value of the statistic χ2  with the 1% significance level to the 
left; the deviation from the frontier is, as such, not only due to noise. The parameter lambda (𝜆) 
indicates the ratio between the inefficiency terms and the random noise term. The value of 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 has to be positive in order to calculate the efficiency term. Likewise, if 𝜆 is statistically 
significant, there is evidence of cost inefficiency in the data. For all maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) models, this parameter is highly significant and positive. Table 4 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the efficiency estimates obtained from the different models.11  
INSERT Table 4: Cost efficiency measures 
This inefficiency is calculated as the excess costs of a given concessionaire in relation 
to those of the optimal concessionaire.12 In general, most of the lower efficiency values are 
obtained with the random model and the Kumbhakar et al (2014) model on the persistent part, 
while the highest values are obtained on the remaining ones, which account for transient 
                                                 
11 Efficiency in  
12 One assumption is that the exogenous variables do not directly influence the frontier. However, we have included 
the four dummies in the frontier in the random and true random effects models. Only regional governments 
increase concessionaire efficiency whereas privatization reduces it.  
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efficiency. This result is in line with results published elsewhere (Farsi et al., 2006).13 In the 
efficiency part of the Pitt and Lee model and the persistent part of the Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardaker (2014) model, the unobserved firm-specific differences are interpreted as 
inefficiency, which suggests lower underestimated efficiency values. The TRE model separates 
the stochastic efficiency term from the firm-specific heterogeneity, adding a firm-specific term 
that captures this efficiency; the TRE model moves heterogeneity out of the efficiency estimate. 
The TRE model provides the same interpretation as that provided by the transient part of the 
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model. The residual or transient efficiency is captured by both models, 
while allocative efficiency is captured by the Pitt and Lee model and the persistent part is 
captured by the Kumbhakar et al. (2014) model. The efficiency within the transient and 
persistent specifications are correlated, while between both groups there is no correlation (Table 
5). Management efficiency is around 97-98%, while the structural problems in this sector 
represent an efficiency of around 92-95%. Indeed, once we have analyzed the mean efficiency 
and the correlation between models, the levels of efficiency are between 92-98%.  
INSERT Table 5: Spearman rank-order correlations of cost efficiency 
The efficiency estimation allows us to test whether or not there are differences in the 
efficiency values related to the characteristics of the various motorway concessionaires. To do 
so, we adopt as our statistical tool the Kruskal-Wallis test. This is a rank-based nonparametric 
that can be used to determine if there are statistically significant differences between two or 
more groups of a variable. The efficiency measure is an ordinal variable; therefore, we can test 
                                                 
13 Another predicted result is the lower efficiency value (0.54 on average) for the fixed effects models. This result 
may be due to a correlation between the heterogeneity factors and the regressors. Whereas in the Pitt and Lee 
(1981) model the firm-specific effects are by construction uncorrelated with the regressors, these factors are 




whether the probability of a random observation from each group is equally likely to be above 
or below a random observation from another group. Unlike the ANOVA test of equality of 
means, the Kruskal-Wallis can be seen as a comparison of the mean ranks. However, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test does not provide the mean differences, which means a second test, such as 
the ANOVA test, is needed to confirm the mean value differences.14 As post hoc tests are run 
to confirm where the differences occurred between groups, they should only be run when there 
is an overall significant difference in-group means. We summarize the results for the 
subsections that follow in Table 6. Recall that persistent efficiency (from the random model 
and Kumbhakar et al., 2014) is time invariant while transient efficiency (from TRE and 
Kumbhakar et al., 2014) is time variant.  
INSERT Table 6: Mean efficiency and Kruskal-Wallis test on regulation and ownership  
5.2.1. Price-cap scheme 
Although initial toll prices depend on each specific concession contract and the winning 
bid, any price update is determined by a common regulatory framework for all concessions. 
Before 2001, national legislation introduced a general rule providing for automatic, yearly price 
adjustments based on inflation, a widely employed regulation in this industry (Iossa, 2015). 
This was reformed in 2001 with a shift to a more sophisticated price cap regulation (RPI-X). 
This more complex price regulation was introduced with an increase in the presence of private 
toll motorways due to the awarding of new concession awards and the plan to privatize the 
National Motorway Company (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009). Even though a price cap 
formula was introduced, the typical X factor, which is commonly attributed to the target of 
                                                 
14 This test has been used in efficiency mean group comparison, as in Stochastic Frontier Analysis in Farsi and 
Filippini (2004) or in transport services (Odeck, 2008b).  
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efficiency gains (Bernstein and Sappington, 1999; Sappington, 2002), was simply the deviation 
between the expected and real traffic received by each concession. Thus, to update the tolls, the 
new regulatory framework combined inflation and traffic deviations. Our expectation, 
nevertheless, is that the price-cap system should not impact concessionaire cost efficiency.  
To analyze the impact of the regulation, we created a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
for years after 2001, and 0 otherwise. Although a price cap regulation affecting public utilities 
is usually expected to provide efficiency gains with respect to other forms of price regulation, 
the specific design of the X factor in the Spanish motorway industry does not necessarily 
provide incentives to improve productivity. According to the categories of tariff adjustment 
regulation proposed by Iossa (2015), this particular regulation lies somewhere between price 
cap regulation and banded rate regulation, given that tariffs are updated to take into account 
earning and risk sharing objectives due to traffic fluctuations, which are partly exogenous and 
beyond the control of the concessionaire.  
Table 6 summarizes mean concessionaire efficiency for both groups and the mean 
difference results from the Kruskal-Wallis test on the price-cap scheme. We use time-varying 
efficiency since the introduction of the price-cap occurs at a specific point in time (2001). In 
the case of the transient efficiency models, introducing the price-cap scheme makes no 
improvement to cost efficiency.15 Under an adjustment system based on inflation, 
concessionaires are fully protected from input price increases, while under price cap regulation 
their protection diminishes by the correction produced by the deviations between actual and 
predicted demand. Thus, it is not reflected in changes in concessionaire cost efficiency. 
                                                 
14 In order to capture the regulatory impact more accurately, we restricted the sample to the period 1998 through 
2003 but found no change. 
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Although this result was as expected, a certain degree of caution should be shown given 
that we rely on a comparison conducted before and after the policy change without a dummy 
variable in the model. Indeed, part of this change could be captured by the linear time trend or 
by other non-linear time trends. Moreover, other unobservable characteristics that change over 
time may affect the result.  
5.2.2.  Central vs. regional granting authorities 
An additional characteristic of the Spanish motorway industry is that it reflects the political 
decentralization of the State, so we find toll motorway concessions that have been awarded by 
either the central or regional authorities. Although toll motorway regulation falls under national 
legislation enacted by the Spanish Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados) – and, as a result, 
there are no major national differences in this respect – regional authorities can allocate 
resources, decide which projects are to be awarded, design the motorway technical project and 
specify the features of the concession contracts. Thus, efficiency differences may arise from the 
scope granted to the regional authorities by national legislation. In our sample, 9 of the toll 
motorway concessions were granted by regional/local governments: in percentage terms, 29% 
of our observations can be attributed to regional/local government concessions, while the 
remaining 71% are attributed to concessions granted by central government. Given this time-
invariant characteristic, we created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the motorway is 
promoted/granted by the central government authority and 0 otherwise.16 We use time-invariant 
                                                 
16 In our case, motorways not granted by the central government can only have been promoted by regional 
governments. We include as regional governments the Diputaciones, the public administration operating at the 
provincial level. This tier of administration lies between local and regional governments.   
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efficiency since the promoter of the motorway does not change over time and the tier of 
government is always the same.  
Table 6 also shows the mean efficiency by group and the Kruskal-Wallis values for the 
persistent efficiency estimation. We find empirical evidence that motorways promoted by 
regional authorities are more efficient (2-5%) than those promoted by the central authority in 
all specifications. These results suggest that regional motorways are on average, slightly more 
cost-efficient than the motorways granted by the central government. However, when 
performing the same analysis for models in which efficiency does not absorb unobserved 
heterogeneity (TRE and KLH transient), we obtain non-statistical differences between groups 
for the two specifications. This result seems to support the argument that lower tiers of 
government allocate resources for motorways better, probably due to a better selection of 
projects and the avoidance of white elephants. Indeed, the current financial crisis in the industry 
in Spain only affects motorways awarded by the central government and, according to Albalate 
et al. (2015), their main problems are linked to project selection issues: route choices, 
overcapacity and above all, low actual demand.  
All these elements have resulted in considerable gaps between capacity and demand, which 
in turn generate financial stress. This trend is easily identifiable in the descriptive statistics for 
our sample. Although regional motorways are more expensive per km, their revenues per km 
double those awarded by central government. Motorway concessionaires appointed by regional 
authorities have invested an average of 8.36 million € per km, while those appointed by the 
central government have invested just 6.82 million € per km. This difference (22.6 per cent) 
can be attributed to the poorer land conditions and the geological difficulties that regional 
motorways faced in their construction phase. Moreover, regional motorways receive higher 
volumes of road users recording an average of 0.898 million per km, whereas the central 
government motorway concessionaires receive an average of just 0.416. For Spanish PPP 
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motorways, Garrido et al. (2017) find that the absolute total construction investment is not 
related to a concessionaire’s economic performance.   
 
5.2.3. Ownership models 
Although the motorway industry in Spain is based primarily on private participation, there 
is some public participation in some of the concessionaires. The impact that public entities have 
as shareholders on efficiency can be tested in the same way as above, given that public sector 
control and presence could have an impact. Thus, we created a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if there is public participation in a concessionaire in a specific year, and 0 otherwise. 
We used time-varying efficiency since both the public and private sector can acquire a 
concessionaire’s shares over time, so that the distribution of these shares changes over time. 
Table 6 summarizes all the Kruskal-Wallis results from the transient specifications. For all 
specifications, we found no efficiency differences between public and private concessionaires. 
A shareholder with a majority control in a concession may be seen as a means of rescuing the 
most inefficient highways and while the participation of the public sector has changed over 
time, at certain points the public sector has been used to rescue a concession or government has 
participated in the management of a highway concession. Thus, there may well be structural 
factors that do not vary in time that account for public participation. 
5.2.4 Privatization  
Central government opted to nationalize various concessionaires in 1984 (Audasa, Aucalsa, 
Audenasa and Autoestradas), only for them to be fully or partially privatized again by public 
auction in 2003. We tested whether these respective ownership models present any differences 
in terms of their efficiency. In order to analyze the impact of privatization on management 
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efficiency, we performed a Kruskal-Wallis test on the concessions that had been privatized. We 
created a dummy that takes a value of 1 if at least 50 per cent of shares are under private 
ownership following a prior period of public control and 0 otherwise. We compared 
concessionaires that have been privatized and, as a control group, companies that were fully 
public for the whole period. We used time-varying efficiency since privatization occurs in a 
specific period of time. Our results show that there are no cost efficiency differences between 
the two groups (Table 6). This result implies that privatization does not offer a better form of 
management.  
Note that an endogeneity concern may arise here if the government opted to privatize those 
companies that were precisely the least efficient. In practice, the motives of central government 
were unrelated to efficiency goals, and they drew no distinction between the companies, all of 
which were privatized in a particular wave of a large-scale program involving public companies 
in all kinds of economic sector. Two primary motives underpinned the privatization program 
in Spain during the government of the conservative party (Partido Popular) led by José María 
Aznar. First, the aim was to obtain extraordinary revenues so as to meet the Maastricht 
convergence criteria for monetary union and, second, the party promoted an ideology of 
limiting the State role in the economy by transferring public assets to the private sector.   
However, there is an additional concern here with regards to self-selection. If the motorways 
that had been nationalized in 1984 – and subsequently privatized in 2003 – were relatively more 
inefficient, then our results could be influenced by the structural efficiency problems of these 
motorways. Indeed, when we compare the levels of persistent efficiency of the motorways that 
were privatized with those of all the other motorways, we find that the former were less efficient 
than the rest. These results can be attributed to the fact that the motorways that were nationalized 
presented structural problems in their initial concession procedure or faced certain geographical 
difficulties, as shown by their levels of persistent efficiency. Thus, we can only confirm that 
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privatization has failed to solve what are possibly non-systematic management problems of the 
public motorways and that private concessionaires have not been able to increase their 
efficiency following privatization.   
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has built an empirical model, applying the framework afforded by stochastic 
frontier analysis, in an attempt at identifying the cost efficiencies of Spain’s toll motorway 
concessionaires and evaluating the role of ownership and regulation – and its reform. We have 
estimated both persistent and transient efficiency using the Pitt and Lee (1981), the true random 
effects and the Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014) models. The estimates have been 
conducted on panel data for the years 1988 to 2015, controlling for different network 
characteristics.  
Our main findings can be divided into two groups: the results of the frontier parameter 
estimation and those of the efficiency analysis. The first group of findings confirms the 
importance of technological progress as a source of sustained efficiency gains in conjunction 
with the presence of unexploited economies of scale and density. Here, we find the density 
economies to be much larger, indicating that increasing traffic is more relevant than extending 
the network. These results would seem to suggest that the fragmentation of the Spanish network, 
operated as it is by many concessionaires, has hindered the potential network effects and, hence, 
the exploitation of economies of scale and density. The current financial crisis faced by the 
Spanish industry has recently led to the nationalization of six concessions which are now 
managed under the same publicly owned corporation. According to our results, this could favor 
an industry that has been badly hit by overinvestment, overcapacity and overestimated demand. 
Although it is unrealistic to expect mergers in this highly regulated, atomized  sector, further 
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developments in the industry as it comes under public management should take into 
consideration the following lessons provided by this study: First, if the government wishes to 
privatize previously nationalized concessions (as occurred here in the early 2000s to the 
concessions nationalized in the early 1980s), it should award large concessions (i.e., comprising 
several motorways that previously were managed by separate concessionaires), to permit the 
exploitation of scale and density economies and avoid replicating the number of concessions 
prior to nationalization. Second, the forthcoming termination of various major concessions will 
provide the opportunity to evaluate their optimal size and to decide whether future concessions 
(if it is decided not to nationalize them) should retain the same number of motorways or not.  
The second group of findings, concerning the efficiency analysis, is associated with 
ownership and the regulatory features of the sector. Here, there is no relation between transient 
and persistent efficiency; they differ in absolute numbers and the low correlations between them 
indicate that they measure two types of efficiency. According to our results, transient efficiency 
is greater than persistent efficiency because of the non-competitive environment of motorways 
and the allocation of inputs. Our findings suggest that the price cap regulation introduced in 
2001 did not increase the transient cost efficiency, since, as expected, it does not affect the 
concessionaire cost structure. Better levels of persistent efficiency are found in the case of the 
concessionaires appointed by the regional authorities; however, no significant differences were 
found in management efficiency across tiers of government. Lower tiers of government 
(regional), in their role as granting authorities, seem to allocate resources for motorways better 
than central government, which probably reflects their ability to select viable projects and to 
avoid white elephants. Regional motorways are more expensive per km during the building 
phase, mainly due to geographic characteristics; however, their revenues per km double those 
of motorways awarded by central government. Note that all the concessionaires presenting 
signs of financial stress were appointed by central government. We also analyzed the role of 
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ownership and no differences were detected between public and private ownership models. 
Motorway concessionaires that were subsequently privatized have not increased their transient 
efficiency, failing to lend support for efficiency gains achieved through privatization. However, 
levels of persistent efficiency were lower in privatized motorways, suggesting that these 
motorways were nationalized due precisely to these lower levels. Yet, what this seems to 
demonstrate is the difficulties involved in increasing managing efficiency – both for public and 
private managers – because part of the inefficiency remains once a motorway has been built. 
Note, nevertheless, that this finding needs to be treated with caution given the small sample 
considered here. 
Our results offer interesting insights for policy makers. Given the current restructuring of 
the industry with the nationalization of the bankrupt concessions and the forthcoming expiry of 
contracts, the debate as to which ownership model offers the best outcomes is likely to 
reemerge. Our findings do not identify any advantages of private ownership in terms of cost 
efficiency, rather they show that the most important aspect for the efficiency of a motorway is 
project selection – that is, whether or not a motorway should be built, and how and where it 
should be built – rather than the ownership of the managing company. In short, greater attention 
should be given to the economic and financial evaluation of projects than to how it should be 
managed. To have quality PPP policies in the adoption phase, countries need to have well 
developed institutions (Rosell and Saz-Carranza, 2019). 
All in all, this paper demonstrates the power of cost stochastic frontier panel data techniques 
as a tool not only for measuring efficiency but also for evaluating public policies in terms of 
their efficiency outcomes. Besides this, our main results on regulatory and ownership reforms 
provide highly pertinent insights for policy makers. It is our firm belief that the methodologies 
that separate both types of efficiency offer great potential to regulators and policy evaluation 
bodies working in the field of transportation. Although few studies of this kind (i.e. in which 
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two types of efficiency are measured) have been reported to date, we expect to see considerably 
more in the future, given their huge potential for refining the analysis and evaluation of public 
policy efficiency.  
Finally, we should identify some of the limitations of our study. We have supposed that 
motorway concessionaires of different ownership types have the same technology. Compared 
with other industries, this is not a major supposition to make; however, the model cannot 
explain the determinants of efficiency. Unless efficiency levels can be systematically changed 
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1st quartile 3rd quartile 
Total costs (million €) 28.5 37.4 8 30 
Price of labor (€) 29,018 10,974 20,751 35,619 
Price of maintenance (€) 94.741 99,972 42,847 96,137 
Price of capital (€) 136,339 141,500 49,464 165,369 
Number of workers 206.35 271.35 69.5 220 
Capital invested (million €) 596,000 591,000 229,000 832,000 
Vehicle-kilometers (million km) 846 1440 121 805 
Length (km) 124.89 138.68 43.1 112.6 
Number of accidents with victims per veh·km 7.89·10-8 6.76·10-8 3.60·10-8 9.32·10-8 





Table 2: Stochastic estimates of total cost function parameter  
Variables 
Random model               
(Pitt and Lee, 1981) 
True Random Effects 











𝛽𝑃𝐿 0.149*** (0.00674) 0.137*** (0.00785) 0.150*** (0.00686) 
𝛽𝑃𝑀 0.271*** (0.00405) 0.272*** (0.00419) 0.270*** (0.00413) 
𝛽𝑌 0.056 (0.17536) 0.181 (0.14374) 0.156 (0.20010) 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑁 0.802*** (0.0500) 0.768*** (0.00385) 0.753*** (0.04983) 
β𝐴𝐶𝐶 0.039 (0.00743) 0.049 (0.03214) 0.025 (0.03514) 
𝛽T -0.0044*** (0.00044) -0.0043*** (0.00044) -0.0041*** (0.00047) 
𝛽𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐿 0.030*** (0.00486) 0.021*** (0.00614) 0.031*** (0.00492) 
𝛽𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀 0.079*** (0.00322) 0.084*** (0.00384) 0.079*** (0.00331) 
𝛽𝑌𝑌 -0.021 (0.17452) -0.138 (0.14440) -0.135 (0.19956) 
𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑁 0.026 (0.05110) 0.074** (0.03650) 0.310 (0.40764) 
𝛽𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶  0.036 (0.03374) 0.045 (0.03120) 0.022 (0.03424) 
Constant 0.0336*** (0.0143) -0.1054*** (0.0115) 0.0342** (0.0171) 
𝜎𝑢 0.1055*** (0.0164) 0.0228*** (0.0023)   
𝜎𝑣 0.0312*** (0.0012) 0.0211*** (0.0015)   
λ= 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝑣
2 3.384*** (0.0163) 1.083*** (0.0032)   
Log likelihood 695.97 701.97  
Observations 451 451 451 
Significance levels: * 10%; **5%; *** 1% (standard errors are presented in parentheses). 
39 
 
Table 3. Scale and density economies 
 Economies of density Economies of scale 










10th  12.268 1.839 2.999 1.144 0.933 1.145 
25th 13.817 3.100 3.793 1.154 0.983 1.109 
50th 17.397 4.887 5.878 1.164 1.077 1.150 
75th 21.231 8.347 10.064 1.176*** 1.128** 1.162** 
90th 24.399 13.412 14.961 1.191*** 1.167*** 1.078*** 
 
Standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





Random model 0.9541 0.034 0.8669 0.9956 
True Random Effects 0.9719 0.0160 0.8736 0.9953 
KLH (2014) transient 0.9823 0.0067 0.9414 0.9951 





Table 5: Spearman rank-order correlations of cost efficiency 
Model Random 
model  




Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardaker (transient) 
Random model 1.000    
Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardaker persistent 
0.777 1.000   
True Random Effects 0.170 0.175 1.000  
Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardaker transient 









Price-cap regulation Granting authority 
Mean efficiency 
χ1














True Random Effects 0.9676 0.9807 
2.143 
(0.1432) 






Random model         











  Model 
 
Public ownership Privatized 
Mean efficiency 
χ1





























Random model         







Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardaker (2014) 
Persistent 
0.9196 0.9379 
1.132 
(0.2874) 
0.9241 0.9195 
8.811 
(0.0030) 
